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6 
Citizen Interests 
A striking development is the ‘coming of age’ of citizen interest organisation, mobilisation, 
and representation at EU level.  There is a dense landscape of NGOs organised and 
advocating at EU level for virtually every imaginable cause, from the unemployed to 
Muslim women to groups countering the long-held monopoly of producer groups in 
technical domains, such as financial services.  A number of EU NGOs are also relatively 
well resourced.  One segment alone, environmental NGOs, has over 130 EU orientated 
staff, and self-declares an annual spend on lobbying the EU institutions of over €13 million.  
The WWF European Policy Office, Transport and the Environment, and the European 
Consumers Organisation, each have a staffing complement comparable to the group of 
best resourced business organisations, bar one (Table 4.1).  EU NGOs have recently 
located a variety of wealthy independent foundations from which to draw financial support.  
Individual NGOs are highly networked by formal organisations and informal structures 
within and across segments, sometimes working alongside one another in purpose 
renovated buildings, often working on joint campaigns.  Manifestos with a coherent outlook 
for ‘people and the planet’ (EEB, 2010) are published together by coalition partners with 
a breadth of scope to match those of political parties standing for election.  And, 
significantly, social movement structures which lie beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of 
institutionalised Brussels NGOs have been engaging the EU using various channels, linked 
to policy making by ‘bridge’ organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 
(Hadden, 2015). 
 
As the European Community was driven by the single market agenda in the decade 
following the corresponding Treaty, so a glance at any of the core contemporary debates 
since the Treaty on European Union reveal that it has come to be gripped by discourse 
about its legitimacy.  Much of the current debate about this focuses upon input legitimacy 
(participation and the means through which policies are made) rather than output 
legitimacy (‘winning by results’).   This model of ‘participatory democracy,’ and the 
systematic empowerment of organised citizen groups as a means to achieve this (Chapters 
1 and 8), explains why organisations articulating interests stated as those of the citizen 
have arrived at the centre of EU policy making.  Such organisations have successfully used 
the discourse of democratic legitimacy for this purpose, ‘framing’ their demands in these 
key terms (Börang and Naurin, 2015).  The linkage of policy agendas to popular discourse 
is captured by the concept of ‘policy framing’, where ‘policy actors try to control the 
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prevailing image of the policy problem through the use of rhetoric, symbols and policy 
analysis’  (Baumgartner and Jones, in Mazey, 2000, p.339).  The all-important ways in 
which issues are defined and ‘framed’ create policy priorities and their treatment in the 
policy process.  These factors have helped to propel citizen issues to the fore of EU policy 
agendas. 
 
A Communication from the European Commission in 2000, ‘The Commission and NGOs: 
Building a Stronger Partnership,’ issued in the names of its President and Vice-President, 
lists six main reasons for co-operation with organised civil society: 
 
• fostering participatory democracy 
• as information relays 
• representing the views of specific groups of citizens to the EU institutions 
• contributing to policy making 
• contributing to project management and policy/programme implementation 
• contributing to European integration (European Commission, 2000). 
 
These roles are a mixture of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy, and therefore help to explain 
the activism of EU political institutions in the formation and maintenance of interest 
groups.  As well as responding to incentives provided by EU political institutions (Chapter 
1), groups have also emerged to fill ‘niches’ which are identified and exploited by 
entrepreneurs.  To the above list can also be added the accountability functions exercised 
by NGOs, by keeping office holders to account.  The flip side is that their own accountability 
is limited in not themselves being accountable to those upon whom their advocacy impacts 
(Chapter 1). 
 
The Landscape of Citizen Interest Groups 
 
NGOs account for around one-quarter of entries on the Transparency Register.  The 
organisational landscape of EU NGOs bears evidence of its institutionalisation, and in 
particular the emergence of ‘family’ NGOs.  The most highly confederated citizen interest 
group is the EU Civil Society Contact Group, with a rotating secretariat.  It is a ‘family of 
8 families’ of EU citizen interest groups, comprising the: 
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TABLE 6.1 Members of the EU Civil Society Contact Group 
Social Platform 35 (full members) Citizen Interest Groups organised at EU 
level in the wider social policy field, spanning demographic 
interests and advocacy.  Initiated by EU institutions, now a 
leading organisation in sector with elevated status in 
institutions.  7 staff.   
CONCORD European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, 
comprising 20 international networks and 28 national 
associations across Europe.  Lead partner of DG Development.  
13 staff. 
Human Rights and 
Democracy Network 
Network organisation of 50 outlets of international peace, and 
human rights, organisations, active at EU level.   
Green10 ‘Family’ network of 10 environmental NGOs active at EU level, 
which purposefully co-ordinates resources between 
participating organisations.  130 staff. 
European Women’s 
Lobby (EWL) 
Confederation of 31 national organisations and 19 
transnational organisations.  Secretariat of 10 staff, plus 
interns. 
Culture Action Europe Family of 90 transnational and national member organisations 
working on EU culture issues.  7 staff. 
European Public Health 
Alliance (EPHA) 
47 transnational organisations and 41 national organisations 
working in public health field.  10 staff + interns. 
European Civil Society 
Platform on Lifelong 
Learning (EUCIS-LLL) 
Umbrella of 40 European networks active in education and 
training.  6 staff. 
 
Sources: organisation web sites 
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A variety of organisations fulfil horizontal niches within the citizen domain alongside the 
CSCG: 
 
TABLE 6.2 Cross-sectoral EU citizen interest associations not in membership of the 
Contact Group of Civil Society  
Name  (Acronym) Year 
Estab. 
Social 
Platform 
Member? 
Role 
    
European Anti-
Poverty Network 
(EAPN) 
1990 Yes 29 national (and regional & local) and 18 
European members concerned with 
disadvantage.  Has developed into a 
horizontal type umbrella organisation with 
a remit of social inclusion.  Heavily 
institutionalised in DG EMPL (Bauer, 2002), 
and has assumed a formal monitoring role 
in the European Employment Strategy.  7 
staff. 
European Council for 
Non-Profit 
Organisations 
(CEDAG) 
1989 No French dominated ‘third sector’ 
organisation, with members from 8 
countries which are national and regional 
councils for voluntary organisations as 
members. One permanent employee, 
supplemented by member resources.  Led 
the unsuccessful pursuit of a European 
Association Statute with DG XXIII of the 
European Commission in the 1990s (Kendall 
and Fraisse, 2005).   
European Citizen 
Action Service 
(ECAS) 
1990 No Direct membership organisation, drawn 
diversely from over 100 EU, national and 
regional NGOs with interests in citizen 
issues/NGOs. Members diversely drawn 
from fields of citizens advice, civil liberties, 
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culture, development, health and social 
welfare, local government, general civil 
society development agencies.  Active on 
direct democracy, free movement of 
citizens, and European governance.  7 
staff. 
European Social 
Action Network 
(ESAN) 
1991 Yes Horizontal mandate with specialisms in 
social, human rights and development 
fields.  Founded by UK and French national 
councils for voluntary organisations, 
members in 17 countries.    Social Platform 
member. 
Permanent Forum of 
European Civil 
Society 
1995 No Federalist outlook.  Active on issues of 
citizenship, participatory democracy, and 
fundamental rights.  Limited membership 
base. 
 
Sources: Organisation websites 
 
The Social Platform was initially created as a joint initiative of DG EMPL and the Chair 
of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in 1995 to 
pursue a ‘Civil Dialogue’ for input legitimacy with civil society, drawing a parallel with the 
‘social dialogue’ for producer organisations.  Its early work was geared at a wide scale 
mobilisation of citizen interests at EU level to this end, but progressively developed as an 
organisation into an institutional interlocutor for EU political institutions (Geyer, 2001; 
Smismans, 2003; Cullen, 2005).  These have included bi-annual ‘civil dialogue summits’ 
with DG EMPL, organising NGO input into the Convention on the Future of Europe (Cullen, 
2005) and in meetings of the informal Council of Social Affairs and Employment (Alhadeff, 
2003). It has previously sought a system of accreditation for EU interest groups on the 
basis of ‘representativeness’ in the knowledge that such a system would leave it at the top 
of the tree, arguing for the highest level of financial support to be reserved for it (Cullen, 
2005).  Seeking to distinguish itself from other organisations, the Social Platform has 
developed criteria of representativeness which need to apply as criteria for other 
organisations to join it as a member: 
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The network or federation must be composed of organisations (not individuals) in at 
least the absolute majority of the EU Member States.  The network or federation 
must be established as a not-for-profit and non-governmental organisation in one of 
the EU member states.  The majority of the organisation’s membership must 
themselves be legally established, not-for-profit and non-governmental.  The 
network or federation must be active in the social sector, working to promote the 
general interest and contributing to social cohesion. The network or federation must 
demonstrate its representativity and that it is structured and managed in a 
democratic way, it is run by an elected body, whose decisions and membership must 
not be subject to approval by any extraneous body (Social Platform, 2010, p.8). 
 
This criterion sets the organisation apart from its competitors, clearly defining its niche 
as representativity.  In its quest for a civil dialogue in which it would play a leading role, 
it has complained that ‘civil society organisations do not currently take part in structured 
dialogue and yet it is these groups who are directly affected by European decisions’ (Social 
Platform, 2016, my emphasis), thus seemingly losing sight of citizens.  By contrast,  the 
Permanent Forum of Civil Society is highly active on European citizenship and participatory 
democracy, with individuals as members.  Similarly, ECAS is a leading organisation in the 
citizen’s rights domain based around its pursuit of citizenship, but whose voice does not 
depend upon its diversely constituted membership list.  It was founded by an ‘interest 
group entrepreneur’ with substantial experience on the Brussels scene who saw a ‘niche’ 
gap in the advocacy market, much in the way in which specific business organisations 
have also emerged and differentiated themselves from one another (Chapter 4).  There is 
space for them all because they all do something different, dependent upon each carving 
out its own distinctive niche.  These differences are apparent in their approaches to 
particular causes.  For instance, a ‘Citizen’s Initiative’ has been a natural cause for ECAS 
to champion.  And the leadership which ECAS (and the Permanent Forum) has given to a 
European ‘compact’ to govern, inter alia, standards of consultation with political 
institutions, draws upon the experiences of its widely drawn membership base, but it 
makes no pretence to ‘representativeness’. For such organisations, their raison d’être is 
rather to advocate a ‘cause’ (i.e. they are ‘what’, rather than ‘who’ organisations), and the 
application of any instrument of representativity as access criteria by EU institutions would 
have a deleterious impact upon their work and status.  This is discussed further in Chapter 
8.   
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The European Citizens’ Initiative 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as a direct 
participatory measure for citizens, and thus entirely set aside from a ‘civil dialogue’ 
between NGOs and EU institution.  A ‘Citizens Committee’, comprised of 7 individuals from 
7 different member states, can launch an initiative on a topic covered by the EU Treaties, 
and, once registered, campaign for the threshold of 1 million signatures from at least 7 
member states (weighted for size) collected within 12 months.  Once signatures have been 
verified, the Commission has three months to consider its response, presented at a hearing 
in the European Parliament.  There is, however, no element of mandation, and thus the 
measure has been conceived as an agenda-setting device, rather than a direct democracy 
measure.  Over 50 campaigns have been launched, introducing diverse topics to EU politics 
for the first time, such as calls for the legalisation of cannabis, for an unconditional basic 
income, and criminalisation of Ecocide.  As direct democracy campaigners estimate it takes 
five conversations to convert to a single signature, the effect of campaigning magnifies 
the way in which EU agendas are brought to the member states.  This ratio is partly due 
to the requirements of signatories to provide campaigners with personal data for the 
purposes of verification, including an address and, in most member states, a passport or 
national identification number. To date, around two-thirds of signatures have been 
collected online (European Parliament Research Service, 2015), but in order to satisfy the 
technical requirements for data protection the design of an online system is particularly 
onerous for campaigners, whilst the use of a ‘captcha’ can deter would-be signatorees.  
Only three campaigns registered to date have reached the 1 million threshold within 12 
months, each launched by organisations with an established network (a trade union, the 
Catholic church, and animal rights organisations), with only one of these achieving a partial 
policy success.  Thus, the value of the mechanism is mostly to raise lesser known issues, 
and the process of campaigning for signatures.  Nonetheless, the measure has enthused 
a young group of activists who enjoy campaigning, mostly fresh from student politics at 
university with experience of studying in another member state, and who are mostly 
distinct from the established world of Brussels NGOs.  Some of these have used their 
networks to take campaigns into some of the new member states (Greenwood and Tuokko, 
2016), introducing some national collaborators to EU politics for the first time.  
 
The Funding of NGOs 
 
The Commission has been a significant source of funding for citizen interest groups 
organised at EU level.  Their purpose in doing so has been to ensure the presence of checks 
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and balances in the ways in which demands are brought to the political system, and to 
perform democratic functions (such as accountability pressures) because of the relative 
weaknesses of other mechanisms (low levels of public engagement, no EU wide media or 
mass political parties, etc.).  Funding is one of a number of mechanisms designed to 
empower NGOs.  Virtually all such groups (Greenpeace and Amnesty International are 
notable exceptions) are beneficiaries of EU funding regimes, such that most NGOs at EU 
level get much of their funding from EU institutions. 
 
It is difficult to establish a precise figure for the total extent of funding by EU institutions 
of NGOs, with estimates from Commission sources varying from €1-2 billion.  Thus, the 
Commission discussion paper of 2000 issued in the name of President Barroso and Vice-
President Kinnock, recorded that 
 
At present it is estimated that over 1,000 million a year is allocated to NGO projects 
directly by the Commission, the major part in the field of external relations for 
development co-operation, human rights, democracy programmes, and in particular, 
humanitarian aid (on average €400 million).  Other important allocations are in the 
social (approximately €70 million), educational (approximately €50 million) and 
environment sectors within the EU.  Several hundred NGOs in Europe and world-
wide are receiving funds from the EU (European Commission 2000b). 
 
The Commissioner announcing the European Transparency Initiative in 2005 recorded that 
‘annually the Commission channels over 2 billion euro to developing countries through 
NGO’s.’ (Kallas, 2005, p.6).  Most policy areas have budget lines for the support of NGOs, 
and some citizen groups organised at EU level receive most of their funding from EU 
political institutions.  Two types of funding are possible; action grants (for specific projects, 
etc.) and operating grants (for core establishment funding).  The Financial Transparency 
System is an online searchable database established by the European Commission of grant 
awards, and the Transparency Register involves disclosure of sources of income. Table 6.3 
provides illustrative data for some organisations which appear in both information sources: 
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Table 6.3: EU Funding of principal EU NGOs 
 
Organisation Funding 
year 
Financial 
Transparency 
Database 
(year if 
different to 
column 2) 
Self-disclosure by 
organisation on 
European Transparency 
Register of amount of 
EU funding/ proportion 
of income 
Culture Action Europe 2014 €2,166,000 €220,000/55% 
European Anti-Poverty 
Network (EAPN) 
2014 €2,246,953  €1,725,351/84% 
European Citizen Action 
Service (ECAS) 
2014 €2,566,062 €2,525,732/99%  
European Consumers 
Organisation (BEUC) 
2014 €4,726,327 €2,553,289/52%  
European Council for Non-
Profit Organisations 
(CEDAG) 
2015 €5,000  €0 
European Environmental 
Bureau (EEB) 
2015 €48,355 €1,313,579/40%  
European NGO 
Confederation for Relief and 
Development (CONCORD) 
2015 €864,458 €700,000/55%  
European Public Health 
Alliance (EPHA) 
2015 €2,175,873 €544,247/67%  
European Social Action 
Network (ESAN) 
2014 n/a €0 
European Women’s Lobby 
(EWL) 
2014 n/a €846,446/78%  
European Youth Forum 
(EYF) 
2015 €6,113,088 €2,725,522/96%  
Friends of the Earth Europe 
(FOEE) 
2014 €813,721  €3,050,338/63% 
Platform of European Social 
NGOs 
2014 €600,000  €598,785/84%  
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World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) European Policy 
Programme 
2014-15 n/a €588,127/16%  
Average EU Funding    56% 
 
Sources: European Financial Transparency Initiative, 2016; European Transparency 
Register, 2016 
 
The above figures provide indicate the staff resources of such organisations.  WWF has 
33 staff, and therefore comparable with the staffing levels of the principal EU business 
associations (Chapter 4). Additionally, such international NGO brands can draw upon the 
resources of branch offices based in other European countries, and upon those of some of 
its members for technical input.  Outside of these global organisations, the organisation 
with the highest number of staff is the European Youth Forum, with 28 staff.    
 
The extent of EU funding raises questions about the independence of citizen interest 
groups.  The view from leading organisations in the sector is that funding from EU political 
institutions is a source of independence (from needing to seek funds from business) rather 
than dependence, rather like state funding of political parties.  Sanchez Salgado found no 
evidence that funding constrains NGOs; whilst there are statements that the recipients 
must not follow goals incompatible with the Treaties, it had no means of monitoring the 
detail of this in implementation, allowing anti-globalisation organisations such as ATTAC 
to access EU funding (Sanchez Salgado, 2014).  The degree of critical engagement by such 
groups with EU political institutions, apparent throughout responses to proposed policy 
initiatives, suggests that such organisations may not feel specifically compromised; the 
Social Platform, receiving over 80% of its funds from EU institutions, once famously 
pronounced in a press release that ‘Mr Barroso, you killed the European Dream’ (Fazi and 
Smith, 2006, p.20).  Nonetheless, there is a likely subliminal general effect that those 
whose livelihood depends upon such funding will tend to have a generally positive outlook 
to ‘project Europe’.  Some of the global NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International, have taken the option not to seek EU funding.  Some authors see the receipt 
of funding as bringing with it a set of perceptions about obligations, including a 
requirement to participate in (relatively inconclusive) open consultation exercises, which 
then helps to secure access to a second tier of more restricted participatory for a 
(Mahoney, 2004; Kohler Koch, 2012).  The implications of this are considered further in 
Chapter 8. 
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There has also been a diversification of funding sources among the EU NGO 
community in recent years.  These include the use of other established charities, such 
as Oxfam and Christian Aid, and foundations with funds historically derived from 
business wealth, such as the Adessium Foundation, the Joseph Rowntree Trust, the 
Sigrid Rausing Trust, the OAK foundation, the Sir James Goldsmith Foundation, and the 
Isvara Foundation.  The latter is unusual in that its funds derive from the wealthy 
Chairman (Ayman Jallad) of a Lebanese business importing and distributing ‘Caterpillar’ 
brand tractors, with funds distributed to beneficiaries through a Swiss bank account 
(Deighton, 2011; Zadek, 2011).  A number of ‘left to outside left’ leaning organisations 
active at EU level have drawn upon a common pool of foundation sources, indicating 
the high degree of network overlap between them.  These ties are strengthened by 
their presence in an NGO ‘eco-house’, purpose renovated premises a short walk away 
from the European Parliament building in Brussels, where around 50 organisations 
share back-office facilities in the Mundo-B building, a ‘palace of protest’ with an 
atmosphere of a ‘well-run students union’ (Ariès and Panichi, 2015).  The occupants 
bridge NGOs with professionalised social movement organisations.  Another Mundo 
facility, the Mundo-J building, is closer still to the European Parliament, accommodating 
30 organisations mainly related to Youth and Education, as well as Transparency 
International.  Still closer to the EP, in the main Brussels property hotspot, is another 
ethical fund house building accommodating the Social Platform and some of its 
members.  
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Figure 6.1: NGO clusters around the European Parliament in the Brussels property 
hotspot 
 
 
 
Key:  
EDF: European Disability Forum 
EP: European Parliament 
FW: Finance Watch 
MB: Mundo B 
MJ: Mundo J 
SP: Social Platform 
TE: Transport & Environment 
 
These realities mean that EU NGOs now have the resources and capabilities to move 
‘beyond victimhood’.  Self-positioning as victims can effectively play upon sensitivities that 
political institutions only listen to one side of the argument.  But the EU NGO community 
now has the resources, the maturity of establishment, and the institutional means, to 
MB 
MJ 
SP 
EDF 
TE
 FW 
EP 
131 
 
move beyond access to participation.  Chapter 2 provided an example of this through the 
participation of environmental and consumer organisations in technical standard setting 
bodies, funded partly by EU institutions.  Participatory mechanisms are also described in 
the sections which follow, and in Chapter 8 where EU procedures designed to equip NGOs 
to participate as democratic agents (e.g. of accountability) are detailed. 
 
Historic Landmarks in the Development of EU Citizen Interest Representation 
 
Consumer groups were the first citizen interest organisations at EU level, reflecting the 
focus of the European Economic Community, and quickly emerged in the years 
immediately following the Treaty of Rome.  This wave was followed by groups representing 
world development and human rights concerns.   Both sets of groups were heavily 
institutionalised in dialogues with the European Commission.  A formal dialogue structure 
between consumer interests and the Commission dates from 1961, and has continued 
(subject to a number of reforms), to the present day. Since the mid 1970s, a Liaison 
Committee with Development NGOs (later CONCORD) embraced an elaborate structure of 
organisations, acting as an institutionalised channel for dialogue with the European 
Commission.  Amnesty International arrived on the scene in the mid 1980s, with other 
groups in the domain arriving following the establishment of EU competencies in the 1992 
Treaty on European Union.  Animal rights groups were also an early citizen group on the 
EU scene.  The European Environmental Bureau was established in 1974 as an umbrella 
body and institutional interlocutor for (and heavily financed by) the Commission, and 
remained the sole environmental public interest group in Brussels until the late 1980s. 
Those who came in the late 1980s, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature, established outreach offices as co-ordinating devices for wider 
movements to address EU political decision making.   
A 1986 report in the European Parliament (Fontaine Report), leading to a subsequent 
EP resolution, put the ‘third sector’ of social and civic organisations on the EU policy 
agenda, recording that  
Europe needs inspiration to take a further step towards its destiny as a Community.  
Nonprofit organisations are an opportunity to be taken in this respect.  Inertia must be 
overcome and this opportunity must be boldly seized (Kendall and Fraisse, 2005, p. 
283). 
 
Most of the action followed during and beyond the TEU period, when a wave of 
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organisations oriented towards poverty, disability, public health, voluntary sector 
provision, justice/home affairs types of issues, came to Brussels.  The Treaty on European 
Union included a landmark declaration, Declaration 23, stating ‘the importance...of 
cooperation between the European Community and charitable associations and 
foundations as institutions responsible for welfare establishments and services’ (European 
Commission, 2006a). Despite this, many such organisations operated at the fringes of 
Treaty competencies, clustering around the emerging social programmes and initiatives 
coming out of DG V, until the insertion of an Article in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty opened 
the gates for the development of social policy beyond labour market measures.  Many of 
these groups also have their origins or spurts of significant development dating from major 
Commission White Papers of the early to mid-1990s, such as those on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment (1993) and European Social Policy (1994), or initiatives 
such as action programmes or mainstreaming (Chapter 5), which resulted in landmark 
social action programmes for the remaining years of the 1990s.  The Social Platform’s 
organisation of two large ‘social forums’ in search of ‘civil dialogue’ during this period were 
also landmarks, helping to develop the social platform’s leadership role for EU civil society 
organisations.  A new budget line for NGOs to pursue civil dialogue in 1997 supported 
these activities. 
 
From the side of EU political institutions, DG EMPL was a clear leader in these ‘social 
policy’ initiatives, whereas the leadership for another set of related, parallel initiatives 
running at the time in the social economy field was provided by a unit within a now defunct 
service of the European Commission, DG XXIII (now incorporated within DG Enterprise).  
Thus unit, together with CEDAG, proposed an ultimately unsuccessful mission for a 
European Association Statute, seeking a legal status for EU organisations in the wider 
frame of democratic legitimacy (Kendall and Fraisse, 2005).  In 1997 the unit launched a 
Commission Communication on ‘promoting the role of voluntary organisations and 
foundations in Europe’ which argued that 
 
voluntary organisations and foundations foster a sense of solidarity and citizenship, and 
provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy.  In the light of the challenges 
now facing the European Community, these functions have never been more vital 
(European Commission, 1997, p.5).   
 
This claim was followed up by the 2000 Commission Discussion Paper ‘The Commission 
and NGOs’, which argued that ‘NGOs can make a contribution to fostering a more 
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participatory democracy both within the EU and beyond’ (European Commission, 2000, 
p.4).  This thinking came downstream in the White Paper on Governance, aimed at 
structuring a system of participatory democracy as a wider solution to democratic 
legitimacy, and is the subject of extensive analysis in Chapter 8.  In acting as a catalyst 
for the creation of a procedural framework for a systematic engagement with civil society, 
the White Paper followed up an agenda first set by the 1992 Sutherland Report 
(Sutherland, 1992). 
 
‘Democratic legitimacy’ was also a catalyst for the creation in the late 1990s of a 
structured dialogue by DG Trade with civil society in the formulation of external trade 
policy, and a direct response to the issues raised by the ‘Battle of Seattle.’   The dialogue 
embraces 600 organisations across the spectrum of civil society (spanning producer and 
citizen interests), structured through 14 organisations elected by civil society, and provides 
funding to allow the participation of organisations based outside Brussels. 
 
The ‘Lisbon agenda’ has been another development agent for civil society organisations 
of all kinds, extending opportunities beyond those organised at EU level for EU 
engagement. Clause 38 of the original European Council 2000 declaration launching the 
Lisbon process states that ‘the social partners and civil society will be involved using 
various forms of partnership’. Objective 4 of the distinctive Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) inclusion process is to ‘mobilise all relevant actors’.  Such relevant actors are 
explicitly envisaged as organised groups acting as representatives of, and proxies for, 
wider civil society.  There have been mixed reports of success in engaging the diversity of 
organised civil society in the process (European Economic and Social Committee, 2004; 
Kok, 2004), but on the credit side the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) and the 
Social Platform have been closely engaged with the design and monitoring of the process. 
EAPN is highly institutionalised in DG EMPL (Bauer, 2002) and receives a significant strand 
of its EU funding for the purpose of promoting the participation and dialogue central to the 
OMC inclusion process (Armstrong, 2003).    There is also a ‘revolving door’ of staff 
between EAPN and DG EMPL (Sanchez Salgado, 2014).  Groups such as EAPN have been 
progressively drawn into the EES through its leading role on behalf of EU social policy 
NGOs in the Social Inclusion Strategy (Armstrong, 2003; De La Porte & Nanz, 2004).   
 
These historical landmarks help to explain the role of citizen groups in the EU policy 
process of today, and their high degree of institutionalisation.  They are brought to life by 
the detail of segments of citizen interest representation, starting with the interests widely 
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seen as having the greatest impact at EU level, environmental NGOs. 
 
 
Environmental Interests 
 
As successive Earth Summits have revealed, the EU’s environmental policies are the most 
advanced in the world. This reflects the reality that environmental issues are a central 
public interest concern throughout (particularly, northern) member states, and are highly 
politicised. Consumer behaviour displays significant environmental motives, and business 
has adopted significant aspects of the environmental agenda in response. Germanic 
Europe has concerns about acid rain, there are regionally acute issues about flooding and 
rising sea levels, and pollutants dispersed into the long, slow flowing Rhine where dispersal 
takes time, contribute to agendas of public concern. Eurobarometer surveys have 
repeatedly shown the popularity of the European level to tackle environmental problems 
based on the premise that ‘pollution is no respecter of international boundaries.’  
 
EU environmental action can be traced back to a ‘landmark’ summit held in Stockholm 
in 1972 which gave rise to the first of a series of ‘environmental action programmes.’  The 
seventh of these runs from 2013-2020.  Beyond these are single market related issues, 
where high environmental protection countries in Germanic Europe have sought to ‘export’ 
their high cost production conditions to lower protection countries, on the whole 
successfully. The Single European Market was the first formal recognition of environmental 
policy in European policy-making, extended by the TEU to the use of QMV and the addition 
of the precautionary principle.  Co-decision powers now apply to most areas of 
environmental policy.  The single market enabled countries to proceed with high standards 
of environmental protection than adopted at the EU level, provided they were compatible 
with the treaties.  A landmark ruling in the Court of Justice in 1988, the Danish bottles 
case (C302/86 Commission v Denmark 1988, ECOR4607 OR 1989 1 CMLR 619), took 
environmental protection beyond single market issues of a level playing field, enabling 
measures primarily designed for environmental protection even if they constituted a trade 
barrier. The number of environmental directives in the period from 1989-91 exceeded 
those of the preceding twenty years (Young, 1995).  These were followed by the 
Environmental Fifth Action Programme (1993-2000), which gave a quantum leap to 
environmental policy with its motto ‘towards sustainable development’, a principle 
incorporated into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.  Those years also saw the establishment 
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of the European Environmental Agency (EEA) in Copenhagen, the fourth enlargement of 
the EU (adding high standard countries to EU policy making), and environmental 
assessment policy mainstreaming throughout Commission policy making and in external 
aid, trade and international relations.  In 1998, the EU signed the Århus Convention on 
citizens’ rights in environmental matters, guaranteeing rights of access to information, 
public participation in decision making, and access to justice in environmental matters. In 
2001, the Gothenburg European Council agreed upon a Sustainable Development Strategy 
for Europe, adding the Environmental Pillar to Economic and Social Pillars as a core 
component of the Lisbon Strategy, and signalling the final arrival of environmental 
agendas as core to EU policy-making.   
These factors raise the issue as to the extent to which environmental interest groups 
have been a driver of EU public policy in environmental protection, or largely operate 
within a set of favourable circumstances more shaped by other influences.  This question 
can be addressed following an assessment of the population of groups and their action.  
The groups themselves tend to see their influences in terms of agenda setting, of which a 
significant recent example concerns the REACH dossier (Regulation, Evaluation and 
Authorisation of Chemicals).   Whilst this is an item of EU legislation, it has a significant 
global impact in that anyone seeking to sell chemicals in Europe has to conform with it.  
The basic principle is that the responsibility lies with the producer to scientifically 
demonstrate to an independent regulatory agency that their products are safe, and in the 
case of reasonable scientific doubt the ‘precautionary principle’ (a presumption of danger) 
prevails.  Tony Long, European Policy Director of the WWF European Policy Office since 
1989, reflected that 
in REACH, without the persistent and very strong lobbying from the environmental 
NGOs, it would not have been possible for the Environment Commissioner to put 
forward such a proposal with such consequences for industry (Long & Lorinczi, 2009, 
p.176). 
 
This extract emphasises the agenda-setting role of environmental NGOs, which is 
further highlighted by a dilution of the final legislation when compared to the original 
version.  Nonetheless, complaints by opposing sets of stakeholders that the regulation was 
too tough or too soft allows EU political institutions to claim that the balance, achieved 
after significant consensus seeking within and between the Commission, Parliament, and 
Council, is about right, and as such certainly reflects a typical outcome of EU public policy 
making. 
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Beyond agenda setting, environmental groups are also well equipped to undertaking a 
‘watchdog’ role (Long and Lorinczi, 2009).  The Water Framework Directive gives NGOs a 
specific monitoring and guidance role, and environmental NGOs are involved in 50 
consultative groups of the European Commission (Fazi and Smith, 2006).  They are well 
capable of engaging policy making at a scientific level, drawing upon EU policy offices 
which are among the best staffed of citizen interest groups, a highly committed network 
of volunteers, and in the cases of Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth, the resources 
of global movements.  As is described below, a core network of environmental 
organisations also co-ordinate their resources for EU related purposes.  Together, these 
enable the environment movement to match the resources which collective business 
organisations apportion to the environmental dimensions of their activities.  For instance, 
Long et al record how traditional energy source companies and some of the main business 
associations such as UNICE, ERT and Eurelectric were ‘not really on the ball’ about a 
significant detail with potentially major ramifications affecting their interests, and failed to 
give it sufficient priority or engage in much active lobbying (Long et al, 2002).  These 
factors suggest that earlier eras in which business lobbying on environmental issues 
swamped the efforts of others (Butt Philip and Porter, 1995) have now passed.  
Nonetheless, where necessary business has significant resources to draw upon for the 
purposes of environmental policy making.  The downstream oil industry has a specialist 
bureau, the Oil Companies European Organisation for Environmental and Health Protection 
(CONCAWE), attached to the Brussels offices of its trade association, Fuels Europe.   
 
As well as conflict can be found degrees of collaboration between business and ‘light 
green’ interest groups, particularly where there is a coincidence of interests such as 
renewables, or where one segment of business is seeking to impose higher production 
costs onto another.  At a more permanent, cross sectoral level, the European Partners 
for the Environment (EPE), a Commission initiated structure under the Environmental 
Vth Action Programme (Lenschow, 1996; 1999), brings together some NGOs (such as 
WWF and the EEB) with business (such as DOW Europe and Hydro) and trade unions 
(including ETUC) and public (mainly local) authorities, ‘to improve cross-sectoral 
collaboration and joint initiatives to align business, capital, markets and society more 
closely with the sustainability agenda’ (EPE, 2016) 
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Some of this mutual learning can be found downstream in industry organised voluntary 
environmental schemes to promote good practice, such as the issue of certificates of good 
environmental practice. The Marine Stewardship Council, for instance, was a joint initiative 
of Birds Eye processed fish foods (then a Unilever Brand) and WWF, involving the 
certification that fish had been drawn from sustainable stocks.  Initiatives such as these 
are geared towards showing how good environmental practice can also be good business 
sense, through meeting consumer demand, providing competitive advantage and good 
positioning, and reducing overheads (Ruzza, 2000).  For business organisations, an 
alliance with an environmental NGO is highly prized, because of the general need for 
alliance making in a consensus orientated decision making system, and because of the 
strength of environmental protection sentiment in Europe.  For these reasons, a European 
public affairs manager of one leading US multinational consumer brand reports spending 
more time talking to NGOs than to EU institutions.  Nonetheless, achieving an issue specific 
business-green alliance in detail is not easy, and often once achieved, is somewhat 
unstable.  There are more examples of participation by ‘light green’ NGOs such as the EEB 
and WWF.  The latter purposefully tries to lend its name to projects involving business 
organisations which have tangible benefits for the environment.  EEB has entered into 
alliances with Orgalime, the EU engineering association, and with the IT and consumer 
electronics associations, about practical collection targets in the framework of the 
European Waste from Electronic Equipment (WEE) Directives.  The risk of entering into 
such alliances is an apparent compromise to ‘ideological purity’.  The latter position may 
be more informed by the need to maintain membership levels and the funds the bring, 
and therefore a niche for some of the ‘dark green’ organisations is to undertake ‘stunts’ 
with high media visual appeal as a means of demonstrating to its members that the 
organisation concerned is active about the things which concern them in a ‘protest 
business’ (Jordan and Maloney, 1997).  In practice, however, even ‘dark green’ 
organisations enter into issue specific alliances with business interests on the Brussels 
scene. 
As well as voluntary initiatives among producers, statutory framework initiatives to 
which the environmental movement has contributed have reinforced and contributed 
towards changes in consumer behaviour. And as well as specific interventions over policy 
measures, the key contribution of Environmental public interest groups, at EU and other 
levels, are the influences they have contributed to the belief systems of policy makers and 
of business and consumers.   
Not long after establishing an office in Brussels, the Director of the WWF European 
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Policy Office (WWF-EPO) reflected that ‘in general the environmental organisations are 
unable to exercise power’ (Long, 1995, p. 678).  Eight years later, he commented that ‘all 
the talk in Brussels these days about the role of ‘civil society’ and the need to consult more 
widely is not just words...whatever the reason, civil society is becoming recognised as the 
missing element’ (Davis, 2003, p. 66).  By 2009, he was emphasising the leadership given 
by environmental groups to the wider NGO community, including their ability to bring in 
much broader ‘policy clusters’ of coalition partners to key environmental campaigns (Long 
and Lörinczi, 2009).  Reflecting on the history of environmental NGOs at EU level from 
their early days, he records that 
 
Now, after several decades of expansion, the (one time) new market entrant is seen 
by some as possibly part of a ‘lobbying oligopoly’ (Long and Lörinczi, 2009, p.183). 
 
For these authors, environmental NGOs have been able to progress beyond their 
traditional strengths of agenda-setting, but a key question remains how capable they are 
of competing with business interests during other stages of the policy process.  One of the 
dimensions of this concerns their ability to participate throughout detailed stages of the 
passage of legislation, of which their resource base is a key part. 
 
Environmental Citizen Interest Groups 
 
Table 6.4 details the Brussels offices of the ‘Group of Ten’ (Green10) environmental NGOs, 
a loose but co-ordinated network ‘of the ten leading environmental NGOs active at EU 
level’ who ‘coordinate joint responses and recommendations to EU decision makers’ 
(Green10, 2006, p.3). 
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Table 6. 4 Green10 Transparency Register declarations 
 
Organisation Financ
ial 
Year 
Total 
budget € 
TR 
activity 
spending 
€1 
EU 
funding 
€ 
N. 
staff 
FTE2 
staff 
EP 
passes 
Birdlife Europe 2014 1,222,760 1-1.25m 316,230 18 18 5 
CEE Bankwatch 2014 1,745,897 300-399k 1,194,195 4 2.8 2 
Climate Action 
Network 
2015 1,240,655 800-899k 262,762 19 15.8 11 
European Envt. 
Bureau 
2015 3,266,046 3.35-3.5m 1,113765 17 16.8 11 
Friends of the 
Earth Europe 
2014 4,830,196 830,736 2,610,891 15 6.5 10 
Greenpeace 
European Unit 
2015 1,625,727 952,627 0 11 7.2 11 
Health & 
Environment 
Alliance 
2014/1
5 
779,086 100-199k 356158 5 2.5 6 
Naturefriends 
intl. 
2014 828,978 Below 10k 199,809 0.5 2 0 
Transport & 
Envt. 
2015 3,721,577 3.5-3.75m 0 19.2 25 17 
WWF EU Policy 
office 
2014/1
5 
3,642,316 2-2.25m 588,127 21.8 33 13 
Total  22,903,32
8 
 6,641,937 130 129.6 86 
 
Source: Transparency Register 
 
The Green10 estimates that its collective membership is over 20 million people (G10, 
2010).  The mass membership base of many of them, together with the skills acquired by 
European offices, enables them to combine institutional politics with traditional social 
movement activism.  As is discussed later, groups such as Greenpeace, and Friends of the 
Earth, act as a bridge between the respective worlds of institutionalised Brussels NGOs, 
and radical social movement networks (Hadden, 2015).   
In addition to the G10 are environmental NGOs outside of the network but with a 
Brussels office.  These include a number of occupants of the Mundo-b building, as well as 
the EU Liaison Office of the Europe Regional Office of the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (fourteen staff), and the European Cyclists’ Federation.  
There are also a number of regionally based environmental organisations. Commission 
funding supports the work of 28 environmental NGOs (Kirchner, 2006).  There are thus 
                                                          
1 Reported in bands or as an absolute figure 
2 Full Time Equivalent 
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around 150 staff working for environmental public interest groups based in Brussels alone, 
supplemented by the potential resources of other European offices of organisations, and 
countless supporters willing to contribute expertise and voluntary assistance.  Greenpeace, 
for instance, claims to have access to over 1200 scientific environmental experts worldwide 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2005, p.116), making for an interesting comparison with those of 
the collective chemical industry (4,000), described above.  Participation at a level of detail, 
it seems, is possible for environmental NGOs throughout the policy process, rather than 
simply relying upon the strength of environmental sentiment to agenda-set issues. 
Apart from some tensions surrounding the position of the EEB, described below, and 
some frictions arising from significant differences in style, relationships within the Green10 
are generally collaborative and well co-ordinated.  They meet together every month for 
purposes of information swapping and co-ordination, periodically with the Cabinet of the 
Environment Commissioner and with the Director General of DG Environment, and, on an 
annual basis, with the President of the Commission.  The Environment Commissioner has 
been known to turn up, unannounced, at meetings of the G10 (Long and Lorinczi, 2009).  
Most G10 members have excellent links throughout DG Environment, meet up in a variety 
of other fora, and get to share thinking.  Co-ordination is particularly good between a core 
‘Gang of Four’, comprising the EEB, FoE, WWF and Greenpeace, who commenced the 
network as ‘G4’ in 1990 (Long and Lorinczi, 2009).  Most of the Green10 have 
competencies in matters affecting the environment across the range of their interests, 
with an informal and unwritten division of labour to enable the organisation with the 
natural specialism to take the lead on it.  This division is not intended to be exclusive, in 
that most of the organisations undertake work on a core of related environmental issues.  
Long and Lorinczi have reflected that 
NGOs might have an advantage over business groups in that NGOs find it easier to 
construct and maintain broad cross-national coalitions than do business interests 
who are essentially in competition with each other and who are differentially affected 
by EU regulation (Long and Lorinczi, 2009, p.177). 
The Green10 claims that it 
successfully lobbied the European Convention to retain existing Treaty commitments 
to sustainable development, environmental protection and the integration of 
environmental concerns into each EU policy area (G10, 2010). 
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This claim once again raises the problematic issue of the extent to which environmental 
NGOs create policy outcomes, or act as contributory voices to outcomes which would have 
happened anyway. There is some confidence among leading G10 participants on this point, 
with Long and Lorinczi claiming that 
A G10 letter to President Barroso in July 2005 was undoubtedly influential in saving 
the seven thematic strategies on the environment being proposed by Commissioner 
Dinas from disappearing off the Commission’s agenda (Long and Lörinczi, 2009, 
p.175). 
Once again, the power of EU environmental NGOs as agenda-setters is stressed by this 
reflection.   
The organisational figurehead for the G10 is the EEB, as the first to be established in 
the field through the environmental services of the European Commission.  As a 
confederation, it carries the usual advantages and disadvantages of breadth, much as the 
review of similarly structured business organisations (Chapter 4) demonstrated.  This, 
along with the need for it to share its space alongside other environmental activists, have 
been the source of the organisation’s principal difficulties. It’s diverse membership includes 
the (UK) Woodland Trust, national branches of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and WWF, 
to the European Union Foundation for Landscape Architecture (EFLA) and the European 
Foundation for City Farms.  Nonetheless, the EEB is a good network organisation for its 
members, and as an organisation in its own right is well networked with other 
environmental NGOs on the global stage.  As an organisation geared to addressing the EU 
political institutions rather than a social movement, it has a wide-ranging set of 
institutional contacts. Consistent with its preference for EU level groups, the EEB has been 
used by the Commission as its main interlocutor across the range of environmental 
interests, and has institutionalised its presence across a range of advisory committee 
structures. It has an astonishingly symbiotic relationship with DG Environment, to the 
extent that Mazey and Richardson record that 
one Commission official suggested to us that the task force which preceded the 
formation of DG (Environment) was originally so weak that it sought the support of 
the NGOs and mobilised and supported them in order to defend itself.  He believed 
that without NGO support DG (Environment) might have died in its early years 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2005, p.115). 
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Apart from meetings with the Presidents of the Commission and the Council, the EEB is 
a member of Commission delegations at Earth/Environmental Summits. 
These strengths apart, the EEB has also had some problems of style. A past Chair of 
the EP Environment Committee once commented that ‘instead of making it short and 
snappy they go in for awfully wearisome and hectoring briefings. Effective lobbying is 
about being selective with information’ (Financial Times, 1994). Inevitably, its influence 
has been diluted since other environmental NGOs established Brussels offices, and the EEB 
has not always welcomed the leadership the latter have sometimes given on particular 
environmental issues.   
The WWF, and the Birdlife International network, are similar in outlook to EEB in 
working primarily through institutionalised channels at EU level. Their strong resource 
bases also enable them to engage policy making at a highly technical scientific level. The 
WWF has something of an establishment image as the world’s largest and best-established 
field based nature conservation organisation, and declares corporate sponsorship amongst 
the financial contributors to its European policy office.  Alongside its ‘cuddly panda’ image 
and institutionalised links, its European office has self-consciously sought to position itself 
as a policy as well as advocacy oriented NGO (Long et al, 2002). Besides using its 
established channels in the national delegation offices in Brussels, it has resorted to the 
European Court of Justice system where necessary to ensure action is taken against 
member states for environmental violations of structural fund initiatives.  It has also played 
an important whistle blowing role, such as providing the European Investment Bank and 
the Court of Auditors with video evidence of environmental violations arising from use of 
the structural funds in Spain (Long, 1995).  In addition, it also makes use of its mass-
membership base through letter-writing campaigns, co-ordinating with the Swiss based 
Europe/Middle East regional office of WWF International (Graziano, 1999).  Birdlife 
International also has a mass membership base, with one million members in the UK alone 
(Graziano, 1999), which it has used in EU politics.  Like WWF, Birdlife also has the status, 
resources (with 100 staff based in the UK; Graziano, 1999), and establishment reputation 
to work institutionally.  
Like WWF and Birdlife, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are also equipped to engage 
EU policy making at a technical level, through permanent resources and supporting 
scientists, and have the ability to turn science into politics through their mass mobilisation 
base when required. Not for the first time, Greenpeace has also been able to triumph 
politics over science, when its mass letter writing campaign over the drinking water 
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directive helped achieve an EP amendment about pesticide limits which the Commission 
accepted despite the opinion of its own scientific advisor (Warleigh, 2000).  Graziano 
records that WWF ‘is quietly critical of Greenpeace and its confrontational tactics, whereas 
the WWF embraces a philosophy whose central tenet is reliance on solid scientific evidence’ 
(Graziano, 1999, p.23). 
Whereas WWF and Birdlife are ‘light’ green, FoE and Greenpeace are more ‘medium to 
dark’ green.  Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) is a highly decentralised network of  
independent national environmental organisations across Europe.  This degree of 
decentralisation means that some FoEE national organisations have activities well beyond 
the environmental domain into general left of mainstream political goals, and some of 
these are highly networked in ‘alternatives’ circles. Its EU office has concentrated more on 
institutional contacts with the Commission and the Parliament, where it has a reputation 
as a valuable contributor of information, than on seeking to mobilise the movement’s grass 
roots base. This illustrates the tendency for radical social movements to become tamed 
over time as they engage, become incorporated in, and influenced by the routines of, 
institutional political decision making, despite one of its original motivations for coming to 
Brussels being the weakness and institutionalised nature of the EEB.  At one point in the 
1980s it sought to establish a rival cross-sectoral organisation to the EEB, seeking to 
attract direct-action-oriented groups, which the EEB diverted by proposing greater co-
ordination with and between the ‘Gang of Four’. As a highly decentralised movement, the 
Brussels office of Friends of the Earth is more self-sufficient than is Greenpeace, whose 
work is more shared between its offices in the member states.  Greenpeace is perhaps the 
most geared to direct-action campaigns and boycotts, although it has also learnt how to 
interact with the European institutions.  Greenpeace actively supplements the resources 
of its Brussels office with those from elsewhere, in that responsibility for discrete EU policy 
areas often lies with national offices.  Thus, Greenpeace Austria and Greenpeace 
Switzerland, for instance, have held responsibility for work on infrastructural Trans-
European Networks, where these issues have high environmental impact and strong local 
mobilisation, with specialists in the Brussels office only for chemicals, climate, electricity, 
and biotechnology. The Brussels office plays a co-ordinating role between these.     
Whilst the differences between the G10 organisations mean that they cannot always 
work together, the overall pattern tends to work well for environmental citizen interests. 
The G10 embrace ranges from the respectable and ‘establishment-friendly’ WWF and 
Birdlife to the more assertive, direct-action-oriented Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. 
It encompasses the mass-membership power base of FoE and Greenpeace, and the 
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institutionalised EEB, WWF and Birdlife. Styles vary too, such as the interpersonal contact 
style of Birdlife, and the informal and loosely co-ordinated, but effective, Climate Action 
Network (Rucht, 1993).  The relationships between the Green10 are more harmonious 
than are many business coalitions, and contain some close alliances, helped by the 
occupation by five Green10 members of the Mundo-b building in Brussels. Because most 
are operational outreach Brussels offices operating with a high degree of autonomy, rather 
than membership offices, they do not have to be overly concerned with internal platform-
building, enabling them to respond quickly to issues.  
With the exception of Greenpeace, all of these organisations have been commissioned 
by the European institutions for investigative work. They all have the technical and political 
ability to turn science into politics by influencing the ways in which issues are perceived 
and defined, to become part of the knowledge communities which drive policy making, 
and to engage public policy throughout the different stages of its formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring. And, crucially, they have helped shape not only the 
thinking of other policy actors such as the Commission and producer groups, but also 
member state preferences towards environmental protection policies. Former WWF-EPO 
Director Tony Long is reported to have responded with delight to a Commission Green 
Paper on Common Fisheries Policy Reform with the words ‘it could have been written by 
WWF’ (Scotland Europa, 2002, p.96). 
Environmental NGOs have a natural ally in the shape of the EP, whose members are 
quick to take up concerns popular with their electorate. Surveys of ‘lobbying effectiveness’ 
among parliamentarians have in the past indicated that environmental groups were rated 
by MEPs as the most effective of all citizen interest groups (Burson Marsteller, 2001).  
However, a repeat survey conducted in 2009 found that NGOs had been overtaken as 
‘effective lobbyists’ in the estimation of MEPs by business interests, and particularly in the 
energy domain (Burson Marsteller, 2009).  This contrasts with an early and celebrated 
‘success’ of environmental interests with the EP, the Bio-patenting Directive of 1995, 
where intense lobbying activity contributed to an atmosphere in which the Parliament, 
using its new powers for the first time, rejected completely an industry friendly 
Commission draft to permit the patenting of genetic modifications.  Thus, attempts to 
locate a clear pattern over time as to the impact of environmental interests are somewhat 
problematic.  The analysis of practitioners of an increasing ability over time to intervene 
in public policy making beyond agenda setting is difficult to test empirically because of the 
difficulty of isolating the impact of environmental interest groups from other issues, not 
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least of which is the general strength of the environment in public sentiment and its 
corresponding strength as an issue within the mechanisms of representative democracy. 
 
Consumer Interests 
The Consumer Programme 2014-2020 records the objective of 
‘A single market where citizens are well represented by professional consumer 
organisations whose capacity is built to meeting the challenge of today’s economic 
environment.’zensre well represented by professional consumer organisations whose capacity is built 
et the challenges of today's economic environment; 
This mini revolution in EU consumer affairs in recent years lies in stark contrast to 
Grant’s assessment of a decade earlier that EU consumer policy was largely symbolic, and 
that European consumer groups were largely outsiders (Grant, 1993).  Whilst that 
assessment was not shared by all other commentators at the time, it is fair to say that 
consumer groups have not been the catalyst for the sea change.  The principal change 
catalyst has been the wider agendas of output legitimacy (a search for popular support for 
the EU through the impact of its policies), and the high, crisis, politics resulting from food 
safety problems, such as those over BSE and poultry.  This resulted in the establishment 
of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2002, and the investment of responsibility 
in the European Commission for food safety along the entire food chain. Other safety 
crises, such as the discovery of phthalates in toys and infant equipment and their 
subsequent ban for use in this context, have also contributed to this development. 
The search for output legitimacy issues include the high profile targeting of particular 
consumer price issues, such as differential cross border car prices, denied and late 
boarding of aircraft, and the abolition of roaming charges for mobile phones used in a 
cross border context. ‘High politics’ and a search for output legitimacy have done more to 
drive consumer policy to centre stage of the EU agenda than fifty years of continual effort 
by EU consumer organisations could.  They have developed an agenda logic of their own, 
almost separate to that of wider consumer policy, following the discourse of ‘consumer 
protection.’  Elsewhere, consumer policy has largely been a story of incremental 
progression, and even potentially major catalysts such as mainstreaming and the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have not lit the touch paper. This bears 
interesting comparison with more radical progression in the environmental domain, 
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because they share similar starting points of Community action programmes (circa 1972), 
and some common development factors, including the embrace of the favourable ‘citizen’s 
first’ discourse: 
• Mainstreaming.  Consumer policy was mainstreamed later (1997 Amsterdam Treaty; 
Article 153) than environmental policy (1992 TEU).  Commission consumer policy 
papers continue to carry calls for more effective integration, contrasting sharply with 
the achievement of environmental policy (European Commission, 2006b). 
• Institutional Development and Support.  In contrast with a history of significant and 
increasing funding for environmental policy, the annual EU consumer policy budget has 
declined relative to 1990. The environmental arena achieved DG status at a much 
earlier stage and has its own dedicated Directorate General, whereas consumer affairs 
only achieved DG status at a relatively late stage, and is incorporated as a junior 
partner within Directorate Generals with a wider remit (Justice and Consumers, DG 
JUST; Health and Food Safety, DG SANTE).  There is around four times the level of 
support reserved for EU Environmental NGOs compared with consumer NGOs, and 
there has been no growth in funding for consumer NGOs in more than a decade.  
Consumer/Commission liaison fora have not progressed beyond dialogue and advisory 
status in over 40 years of operation.  Consumer policy is somewhat submerged in a 
Council which also covers employment, social policy and health, a re-organisation 
decision taken without any prior consultation of consumer representatives (BEUC, 
2002a).   Nonetheless, DG JUST has witnessed substantial development of instruments 
with which to engage with civil society organisations in recent years, and in particular 
with the development of Platforms in which companies have made public pledges which 
have the effect of advancing the consumer and health policy fields (Chapter 4).  
Nonetheless, the environment has had a ‘social dialogue’ type mechanism for some 
time in the form of the European Partners for the Environment. 
• Different single market dynamics. Both areas acquired a firm legal basis for European-
level actions as domains requiring action parallel to the single market and the use of 
QMV.  Whilst environmental policy took off around the time of the single market 
programme and has enjoyed some radical development landmarks since, the single 
market was no radical launch paid for consumer policy, whose development has been 
more incremental and more dependent upon uneven crisis points.  In environmental 
policy, progress has been made by ‘leader countries’ seeking to export their high cost 
production conditions to ‘laggard countries’ via single market measures.  In consumer 
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policy, the market advantage of high protection in consumer goods outweighed the 
competitive losses of higher production costs, giving leader countries the incentive to 
keep their market advantage to themselves (Young, 1995).  
• Focus. Consumer behaviour is more driven by the sharper focus of green 
considerations, whereas the constitution of a ‘consumer’ interest is more elusive. 
Consumer organisations have borrowed the discourse of environmental groups.  
Alliances between environmental and consumer groups have been driven more by 
environmental issues, such as the European Campaign for Clean Air, which brought 
together  consumer, environmental and public health organisations with a ‘European 
Clean Air Campaign’ to lobby for strict automobile standards (Webster, 1998; see also 
Young and Wallace, 2000). 
• Responsible Agents. While both agendas involve socialising the message ‘it’s good 
commercial sense for business’, the construction of accompanying measures to enable 
and build consumer confidence in making cross-border transactions involves public 
authorities to build infrastructures rather than action that is within the gift of business 
to take. These infrastructures involve considerable transaction costs.  Whilst the 
adoption of standard currency measures (€, metrification and labelling) has made cross 
border transaction comparisons easier and some progress in reducing differentials has 
been made, variations are still considerable, and some sectors continue to confront 
consumers with trade barriers.  Consumer and citizen organisations have helped the 
Commission to energetically confront these through ‘whistle blowing’.  The Commission 
has also supported from the consumer policy budget an EU wide out-of-court 
complaints network for cross border financial service issues, FIN-NET. 
Differing degrees of centrality to business. Consumers engage the core operations of 
businesses in markets, and contesting business has been more difficult for consumer 
groups. Environmental agendas have been grafted on to business agendas by more 
mixed sources.  
• Collective Action. Whilst the Green10 has grown, the number of pure consumer policy 
oriented organisations at EU level has shrunk to one (BEUC), and one concerned with 
input to technical standards bodies.  BEUC is a confederation, whereas most of the 
environmental organisations are outreaches of wider movements, able to act quickly.  
There has been considerable recent change in the landscape of EU consumer 
organisations in recent years. Three organisations have disappeared entirely, while 
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another two have lost funding from the Commission.  The Consumer Policy Programme 
continues to seek to increase the participation of consumer organisations in EU policy-
making, despite around 50 years of institutionalised dialogue. 
Whilst BEUC is the sole European-level organisation dedicated to the representation of 
consumer affairs in public policy making, two further long established organisations include 
consumer issues within their domain.  One is a producer association of the co-operative 
movement, (EUROCOOP), while another (COFACE) focuses more on family issues in its 
slimmed down format.  A further organisation at the technical level is the European 
Association for the Coordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation (ANEC), 
established in 1995.  ANEC was originally established within the structures of BEUC, but 
is now an independent organisation in its own right, and which includes other EU consumer 
organisations within its governance structure.  It is substantially funded by the 
Commission, enabling it to employ twelve staff, and involves experts in the technical work 
of 155 European and international standards committees, deployed in a quite deliberate 
way to act as a counterweight to industry in them.  These are concentrated in some of the 
most sensitive areas such as child and vehicle safety, as well as household appliances, and 
general services such as post, tourism and road transport.   
All of these organisations have supplemented their central resources by drawing upon 
those of its members, and BEUC has used this resource for particular needs. European 
Transparency Register data indicates that BEUC has an annual budget approaching 
€5million, with 26 staff, as well as the ability to draw upon the substantial resources of its 
member organisations (the UK consumer organisations, for instance, employ around 400 
staff). It has specialist organisational divisions responsible for legal affairs, food, health 
environment and safety, as well as departments for communications and training.  These 
enable it to make a contribution to the detail of specific dossiers, enabling it to work across 
the range of issues in consumer affairs.  Its relatively large legal department also equip it 
with the ability to handle conflictual relations where necessary (Wallace and Young, 1997).  
There have been highly conflictual relations, with DG Agriculture and Rural Affairs (DG 
AGRI) (Young, 1998), and with business interests, and in particular the pharmaceutical 
industry and automobile manufacturers. In the latter case, consumers have taken 
advantage of divisions among producer interests to form strategic alliances against the 
car companies with spare parts manufacturers and insurance companies (Young and 
Wallace, 2000). Other automobile campaign activities have included press and publicity 
drives to publicise price differentials and trade barriers, whistle blowing monitoring against 
individual manufacturers with DG Competition (Holmes and McGowan, cited in Young, 
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1998), and in legal work, including supporting and working for referral of cases to the ECJ 
(Harlow and Rawlings, 1992).  BEUC has been a contributory factor to similar work within 
the Commission which has clearly had an impact on the car market.   
 
BEUC has long been able to make a contribution to the detail of debate on particular 
issues. In a generalised sense, the consistency of its market orientation with those of core 
single market objectives makes it easy to operate alongside its core partners in the 
Commission, although embracing members from high, and low, protection countries 
means that common platform building is not an easy task (Young, 1998). BEUC meets 
each incoming Presidency, and enjoys regular meetings at Director General level.  BEUC 
went out of its way to welcome the Consumer policy strategy 2002-6, and has been 
involved in its delivery.  A core of this strategy, and the Community action programme in 
consumer policy 2007-13, is capacity building for consumer organisations, and BEUC has 
delivered courses on Commission premises aimed at organisations from the new Member 
States on subjects such as lobbying the EU institutions, paid by the EU institutions.  The 
history of institutionalised dialogue on consumer affairs with the European Commission 
has not been altogether happy, with decisions slow in forthcoming, highly prone to 
compromise, and members reluctant to defend them. In-fighting has characterised the 
history of institutionalised consumer consultative structures between the Commission and 
consumer organisations.  The European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) comprises 
one member representing national consumer organisations from each Member State, and 
one member from each European consumer organisation (ANEC, BEUC).  The Commission 
is free to ignore the decisions of, and rather little heed has been taken of them, or of those 
of its predecessors.  Nonetheless, BEUC is represented in a range of advisory committees 
across the Commission.   
 
Unsurprisingly given its quest to represent civil society, the European Parliament has 
been a kindred force for consumer interests throughout its existence. Its high-status 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) has taken on the mantle of 
its predecessor as a forceful promoter of consumer interests and a consistent critic of the 
Commission for its failings in the consumer policy field.   Consumer organisations have 
been able to use this route as a means of inserting amendments into Parliamentary 
business, and BEUC’s resources are heavily drawn upon by individual MEPs. 
 
To a certain extent, the impact of the European institutions and consumer organisations 
upon each other has been mutually reinforcing. Consumer organisations have played a 
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part in producing a general climate whereby consumer interests are taken into account at 
the European level, and European manufacturers have embraced consumer needs and 
desires through higher product standards. For influences in the other direction, the 
European institutions have played a part in improving consumer representation, at both 
national and European levels. Industry in Europe has become more oriented towards 
quality in the manufacture of products.  The EU has been a contributory climate to this, 
with a General Product Safety Directive (1992; revised 2001), placing on manufacturers a 
duty to monitor marketed products for safety. Under the provisions of this directive, firms 
now have a duty to assess and investigate consumer complaints, to identify product 
batches and to sample-test marketed products, while legislators can remove any product 
from the market for up to a year.  These factors indicate how far consumer issues have 
come on the EU agenda since their ‘symbolic’ days. Where there is unavoidable conflict 
with business interests, so consumer organisations have been able to exploit the natural 
divisions between business.  Whilst the EU agenda has been driven more by individual 
crises incidents than by consumer organisations, the wider discourse of a ‘citizen’s Europe’ 
has made it an easier climate for consumer organisations to operate in.  This discourse 
has enabled consumer organisations to increasingly work together on an issue basis with 
environmental, citizen, and social organisations.   
 
Social Interests 
The development of organised social interests at the EU level hinged upon the European 
Commission until the arrival of the European Social Platform in 1995.  Many Social NGOs 
originate from Commission initiatives aimed at creating a solid foundation for, and 
expansion of, European integration.  The pattern of action in each case is very similar, 
with different outcomes.  In the first instance, the Commission has taken the action of an 
initiative designed to create some momentum, such as a conference linked to a theme of 
the particular European Year of Action.  Funds have been provided for a group by the 
Commission (sometimes historically on a doubtful legal basis), sometimes with little 
evaluation of the use to which funds have been put (Harvey, 1995) other than the 
knowledge that a support structure would be in place to carry demands for integration to 
member states.  These have tended to be in safe fields where member states would find 
the agendas difficult to openly resist calls for action despite them inevitably commencing 
a road leading to further European integration, such as equality for women, for people 
with disabilities, and actions in the anti-racism field.  The establishment of Community 
action programmes provide a firm foundation of resources to create, and support to 
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nurture, NGOs in the field capable of taking the cause direct to the doors of member states.  
Once this process is in place, the Commission then proposes the strategy of 
mainstreaming.  This is followed by an attempt to insert the issue in the Treaty, enabling 
further action programmes.  While the first, ‘best case’ cause is being pursued, other, 
sometimes more difficult causes, are grouped together with the leading cause in a 
campaign for widely embracing action to be enabled under Treaty provisions.  The 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty provides a classic example of such a course of events.  Following a 
sustained campaign by (then) DG V and social interest groups, told in further details below, 
Article 13 provided for ‘appropriate action’ to combat discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.   
Two further, linked, cases enable further exploration of the Commission/public interest 
axis in developing European integration, and provide classic examples of the role of DG 
Employment and Social Affairs in preparing the groundwork for, and building on, the Article 
13 agreement in the Treaty of Amsterdam.  They also demonstrate the limits to, and 
constraints of, Commission action in working with groups to develop European integration.  
To support the campaign for Article 13 in the Amsterdam Treaty, DG EMPL (then DG V) 
proposed that 1997 be designated the European Year Against Racism.  It added a €7m 
funding package for projects in that year including support for NGOs, the establishment a 
European Monitoring Centre against Racism and Xenophobia, and a major network event 
in Brussels bringing together 130 anti-racism organisation to form the European Network 
Against Racism.  The following year, 1998, with Article 13 safely in the Treaty, saw the 
Commission Action Plan against Racism, with 176 projects funded, and an attempt by DG 
V to introduce new legislation on mainstreaming (Guiraudon, 2001). 
 
The Commission’s work on anti-racism dates from 1986. In support of this work, the 
Commission acted on an initiative of the Parliament to establish the (now defunct) 
European Union Migrants’ Forum (EUMF) in 1991, actively intervening to shape the group’s 
parameters and operations during its turbulent history (Geddes, 2000; Guiraudon, 2001).  
A later group was the Starting Line Group (SLG), a group of activist lawyers. SLG helped 
in the first instance by preparing a draft directive outlawing racial discrimination, modelled 
on the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive (Geddes, 2000; Case and Givens, 2010).  Whilst 
this was never implemented, post Amsterdam SLG brought forward another proposal for 
a Directive putting into effect the principle of equal treatment (Geddes, 2000).  Geddes 
comments  
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It is possible to detect the influence of the SLG’s proposals on policy development within 
the Commission, (p.644)…pro migrant lobbying at EU level has centred on the building 
of alliances between lobby groups and sympathetic EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission and the EP (Geddes, 2000, p.645.) 
Similarly, Case and Givens stress the impact of the SLG, but in particularly, the support 
of the Parliament to do so, where there is a significant Intergroup on Anti-Racism and 
Diversity.  The European Network Against Racism (ENAR), established in 1998 as an 
outcome from the 1997 European Year Against Racism, also claims some responsibility for 
the Commission launch of a new non-discrimination Directive in 2008, covering aspects of 
discrimination beyond the workplace.  ENAR is a core partner of a DG EMPL funded 
programme on ‘promoting strategic litigation’ that trains NGOs to identify test cases to 
bring forward which seem likely to push forward the frontiers of EU policy competencies 
in the field (Case and Givens, 2010). 
 
A similar pattern of Commission activism is evident from the case of homelessness, 
although the outcome has not resulted in an extension of EU competencies.  In 1989 the 
Commission used a generous interpretation of a general clause in the Treaty of Rome 
(improving quality of life) to fund a conference on homelessness and housing provision.  
This was a subject in which there are very few EU competencies, and the conference was 
funded in the hope of kick-starting initiatives and finding a more permanent demand 
constituency that would be a supporting measure for European integration.  It invested 
some effort into the creation of a group that emerged from the conference, the European 
Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA).  The 
Commission found useful things for FEANTSA to do, such as designating it with official 
‘observatory’ status to supply it with information on the state of homelessness in Europe. 
The example is a highly typical one of each of the stages and the specific measures taken 
by the Commission to work with NGOs as agents of integration.  Yet more than two 
decades later, beyond the generation of reams of information, neither the Commission nor 
FEANTSA have much to show by way of changes to EU competencies in the housing field, 
other than generalised credit among a specialised community for taking forward a social 
measure.  
The FEANTSA case lends support to an alternative interpretation, of the Commission-
social NGO relationship as a ‘frothy’ one, generating much noise but little by way of hard 
achievement. Whilst DG Employment and Social Affairs has rolled out programme after 
programme in social fields, with measures such as anti-racism and anti-poverty, the 
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impact is little more than symbolic. The anti-poverty programmes, for instance, had a 
budget of €55 million over a five-year period, supporting small-scale ‘pilot projects’, 
research, and networking needs of interests groups, in the context of an estimated 50 
million plus EU citizens being trapped in poverty.  In this view, actions such as ‘theme 
years’ of ‘Solidarity Between Generations,’ ‘Anti-Racism’ ‘Languages’ and ‘Sport’ have been 
empty shells. 
 
‘Social Europe’ has its origins as a series of measures adjunct to the single market.  
Until the Commission Green Paper on Social Policy in 1993, ‘social Europe’ in ‘Euro-speak’ 
meant workers’ rights.  The soundest legal basis in the Treaties for ‘social policy,’ until 
Article 13 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty became the gatekeeper for more traditional social 
policy, arose from measures to ensure a level playing field in production between the 
member states in the single market. Thus, the Treaty of Rome contained provisions for 
equal treatment of men and women, social security for migrant workers, and health and 
safety of workers, which came to be governed by QMV by later Treaty changes (Wendon, 
1997). In fields that could easily be related to employment, such as equal opportunities, 
training, exclusion from the labour market, disability, and protection and movement of 
workers, the Commission has had little trouble in developing and funding programmes and 
initiatives. Interest groups in the fields of women’s rights, young people, disabilities and 
refugees became well established and resourced, and well embedded into their patron’s 
corners of the Commission. A caveat is that each of fields spawned multiple organisations 
working within them, despite the presence of leader organisations.  One of these examples 
concerns the representation of women, where a combination of circumstances makes it 
another ‘most likely scenario’ case to consider the impact of public interest groups on 
European integration. 
 
The mixture of the EU labour market focus, an irresistible policy frame of equality, a 
committed patron, a strong network of grassroots organisations, and the ability to work 
in institutionalised politics, combines to create a favourable set of circumstances for EU 
women’s organisations. The Commission and the ECJ have become powerful institutional 
advocates of EU equal opportunities policies (Mazey, 2000), and the women’s movement 
has long been embedded within DG Employment and Social Affairs (Mazey and Richardson, 
1999).  The European Women’s Committee was among the first advocacy organisations to 
emerge, in 1984, created by a group of women working in the European Commission, 
seeking to build upon dramatic successes achieved in the European Court of Justice arising 
from the 1976 Defrenne case.  Once again, the Commission was the first and main activist 
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on the EU scene, and funded conferences the first vehicle for action.  These factors gave 
rise to a series of densely organised European women’s advocacy and network 
organisations covering a variety of niches, with, by 2010, around 55 women’s 
organisations active at EU level.  The lead organisation, EWL, was itself formed in 1990 
from a coalition of traditional and radical feminist women’s groups.  Its member 
organisations, comprising organisations in 31 countries and 19 European wide networks, 
themselves embrace over 2000 member organisations. It uses this network to undertake 
EU public education campaigns in the member states, undertaking ‘roadshows’ to explain 
the potential impact of new Treaties, and satellites its board meetings around different 
national venues.  These efforts make it notable among the wider constituencies of EU 
interest groups by seeking to engage with citizenry direct, and popular within the EU 
institutions, particularly within DG Employment where it is heavily institutionalised (Mazey, 
2000).  A past secretary general of the EWL who went on to work in the Commission has 
reflected that its ‘survival and effectiveness depend on friendly individuals inside the 
European Parliament and Commission’ (Helfferich and Kolb, 2001, p. 148).  The expected 
close relationship between the EWL and the Women’s Committee of the European 
Parliament has been confirmed by Cullen (Cullen, 1999). 
 
 At a very early stage, the Commission established a Women’s Employment and 
Equality Office inside the Employment and Social Affairs Directorate responsible for policy 
promotion and co-ordination (Harlow and Rawlings, 1992), and which later became the 
Equal Opportunities unit (Pollack, 1997). Gender equality at work came under QMV rules 
at the TEU, while the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a number of significant new gender 
equality initiatives, including provisions applying beyond the labour market, gender 
mainstreaming, and a new provision for equal pay for work of equal value (Helfferich and 
Kolb, 2000).  A number of other gender equality provisions were also reinforced, such as 
those enabling member states to take ‘positive actions’ in the labour market, and anti- 
discrimination provisions. Helfferich and Kolb remark that Treaty amendments passed to 
extend gender equality at the Amsterdam Treaty were  
 
at least partly the result of a co-ordinated lobbying campaign of the European women’s 
movement spearheaded by the EWL (Helfferich and Kolb, 2000, p.143), 
 
and that the EWL was  
 
one of the few European public interest groups in the social policy field that was 
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successful in having its demands taken by the governmental representatives 
negotiating the new Treaty (ibid., p.144)... the active campaigning of the EWL was 
crucial for the extent of the changes (ibid., p.147.). 
 
According to these authors, EWL’s Spanish member convinced the Spanish government 
to adopt EWL positions as their own, and from there got the position into Treaty 
negotiations.  The authors do specify that ‘the final outcome would fall well short of the 
Lobby’s expectation, but it was nevertheless greeted as a success by the organisation’ 
(ibid.).  A further, stronger dose of caution should be added to the interpretation reached 
by the authors, in that the story is told by a former secretary general of the EWL at the 
time of the ‘campaign’, who claims that the EWL went ‘one step further than the other 
groups working on the treaty revisions’ (p.156).  Just as the ERT was not the prime agent 
responsible for the single market, so neither was EWL single-handedly responsible for the 
measure in the Treaty. The authors do acknowledge that the ‘campaign’ came at the right 
time, when there was considerable concern within elite circles that there might be a repeat 
of the TEU scenario and a rejection of the Amsterdam Treaty.  Other authors, too, have 
lent a similar interpretation.   Mazey has argued that women’s organisations have been 
important agents in the adoption of mainstreaming strategies in EU and member states. 
Using similar arguments to those presented by Helfferich and Kolb, Mazey has highlighted 
the importance of mobilising networks and ‘political opportunity structures,’ and draws 
upon her earlier work to outline the importance of a sympathetic ‘policy frame’ in the 
relevant DG in determining the degree to which mainstreaming has had an impact (Mazey, 
2000). 
 
The European Commission has successively launched five year strategy programmes 
for equality between men and women.  The Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG) claims 
that the adoption of the 2006-10 programme arose from lobbying by the European 
Women’s Lobby, noting that  
 
it covers approximately the same areas as the EWL Roadmap and contains some of 
the same vision and strategies for gender equality, although the official measures 
foreseen are not as strong, far reaching, and precise as the ones suggested by the 
EWL text (CSCG, 2006, p.17). 
 
Similarly, in 2010 the EWL issued a press release in which it ‘welcomed the launch of the 
EU’s much anticipated new five year strategy for equality between men and women’, 
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noting in particular how ‘women’s rights groups are positive towards the envisaged annual 
top-level Gender Equality Dialogue amongst key stakeholders and stress the importance 
of the presence of key women’s organisations at such fora’ (EWL, 2010).  The latter is a 
further reference to the continued institutionalisation of EWL, with the dialogue involving, 
inter alia, the Parliament, Commission, Member States, Council Presidencies, and the EWL.  
This picture of an organisation granted a quasi-monopoly in representation in return for 
pursuing an insider strategy is confirmed in a recent analysis by Jacquot and Vitale (2014).  
Johansson and Lee show how this position is enforced by EWL screening member 
applications for conformity of viewpoint (Johansson and Lee, 2014).  As a systemic insider, 
the EWL works differently from organisations based on popular mobilisation, the 
characteristic of social movement organisations. 
 
Social Movements 
 
The increasing engagement of the European Union by ‘social movements’  has been viewed 
in a more or less hopeful way by a number of commentators (Tarrow, 2006; della Porta, 
2007; Erne, 2009; Crespy, 2014; Parks, 2015).   Della Porta claims that 
 
it is possible to already delineate some elements of an emerging European 
movement, in which a set of organizations and discourses are interwoven in 
extremely flexible organizational structures, with identities that are tolerant of 
difference.  Common denominators of such mobilizations that seem anything but a 
passing fad include demands for social rights and a democratization of European 
institutions, not least through the creation of a supranational, critical public sphere 
(della Porta, 2007, p.205). 
 
Such movements appear to be drawn more from globally orientated activism rather 
than national origins (Tarrow, 2006), ironically mainly to the theme of ‘anti-globalisation’.  
A common feature of ‘new social movements’ are their ‘alternative’ perspectives’.  Leigh 
cites the way in which Anheir, Kaldor and Glasis characterise this as 
 
an experiment in and demonstration of new ways of living and new types of social 
relations – non-hierarchical and consensus-based (Leigh, 2009, p.5). 
 
A key issue concerns the point at which – and whether - a distinction can be drawn 
between organisations which are ‘social movements’ and those which are part of the ‘usual 
157 
 
circuit’ of Brussels based institutionalised NGOs.   A usual caricature is that between 
advocacy ‘insiders’ to activist ‘outsiders’ (Tarrow, 2006), ranging from institutionalised 
charities headed by royal patrons through to the ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of 
Transactions for the aid of the citizen) network and beyond to ‘loosely affiliated anarchists’ 
at the other extreme (Hadden, 2009, p.13).  There are normative overtones conveyed by 
labels such as ‘new’ social movements, or idealised juxtapositions between 
‘professionalised and bureaucratised associational civil servants’ on the one hand, and 
‘radical’ organisations populated by ‘grass-roots activists’ (Saurugger, 2009) pursuing ‘the 
politics of the street’ (ref.).  This is to some extent also evident in Saurugger’s definition 
of a social movement as  
 
collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people 
with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents 
and authorities (ibid., p.8).    
 
A key point is the extent to which the activities of such actors contribute to, or detract 
from, EU legitimacy.  Is, for instance, the occupation of business association offices (there 
were such incidents at CEFIC, and ERT) by activists to be interpreted as a positive sign of 
engagement and populating the public space with debate?  Erne claims that ‘most political 
scientists concur that social actors contribute to Euro-democratization if they contribute to 
the rise of a European public sphere’ (Erne, 2009, p.2).  He argues that 
 
social actors contribute to Euro-democratization if they contribute to the making of 
a European public sphere, act collectively on a European level, and politicize the EU 
integration process in the transnational European public sphere (Erne, 2009, p. 4). 
 
Hadden takes a critical view of the message that ‘any engagement is a positive 
contribution to legitimacy by creating a public space’ on the basis of an assessment of the 
activities and perspectives of 37 organisations and a variety of activists.  She casts the 
perspectives of ‘radical’ organisations based around anti-globalisation lenses as potentially 
de-legitimising for an EU seen by such activists as broadly pro-liberal.  Her analysis 
confirmed the presence of two distinctive segments of actors at EU level, split between 
‘conventional’ actors and those that use ‘contentious actions’, with organisations such as 
Greenpeace acting in a brokering role as a bridge between these two worlds (Hadden, 
2015).  Nonetheless, some organisations are forced to play the institutionalised game by 
the need for policy advocacy and funding (Leigh, 2009; see also Sikkink, 2002).  There 
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are also ‘hybrid’ cases where ‘protest and institutionalised contention go hand in hand, 
with some actors among civil society pursuing dual strategies’ (Crespy, 2009, p.16). The 
European Social Forum has been a venue for these various types of players to meet, with 
participants balanced more towards ‘outsider’ than ‘insider’ organisations (della Porta, 
2007).  The Forum has met on a more or less bi-annual basis since shortly after the ‘battle 
of Seattle’, but there are preparatory meetings four times yearly with up to 400 activists 
present at events (Doerr, 2009). 
 
Ruzza shows how social movements have found a niche which fulfils a variety of 
functions they need to meet (Ruzza, 2011). They become ‘norm entrepreneurs’ at EU level, 
bringing ideas into the EU environment and  contributing to otherwise limited 
understanding of issues, as well as providing a voice for otherwise marginalised parts of 
civil society, and a check and balance upon producer orientated lobbies.  Sometimes they 
put forward an often utopian vision of desirable policy change that other more moderate 
organizations can utilise as a negotiating standard. Characterising a type of organisation 
which lie somewhere between traditional social movements, and institutionalised actors in 
the political system, he moves beyond traditional caricatures of once independently 
minded organisations whose destiny is to become progressively institutionalised and 
removed from their grass roots origins.  He identifies a set of intermediate organizational 
forms that retain some of the features of social movements but have also acquired some 
of those distinctive of NGOs, including a degree of professionalization, service delivery 
roles, and better legal skills. Direct representation arises through organisations which are 
part of the social movement ‘family’, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, but 
who can also play the ‘institutional politics’ game, apparently without too much 
compromise or tension  (Ruzza, 2011).  These ‘broker’ organisations are highly skilled in 
alliance-building; they were key agents in the formation of the ALTER-EU alliance in the 
creation of the European Transparency Register (Chapter 3), and where required they 
build alliances with producer organisations for common cause campaigns, such as 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Parks, 2009a).  The ability to create alliances with 
producer constituencies is also a noted skill of WWF, considered earlier in this chapter. 
 
Protest and direct action have always been the traditional tools of ‘outsider’ movements, 
now facilitated, empowered and extended by the use of ‘cyberactivism’ (Thomas, 2004).  
The key point is that the internet allows activists to find and communicate with each other, 
to engage in attacks on the IT domains of opponents (‘hacktivism’) and provides an 
unprecedented platform for mobilisation and broader public communication.  The latter 
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has been used in a way which is orientated towards public accountability of either political 
institutions or opponents, influencing public policy through public message, and by 
confronting opposing interests.  Web sites are carefully constructed in a way to attract the 
casual browser, using satire as a weapon (Balme and Chabanet, 2008), aimed at striking 
chords with populist outlooks about the influence of finance in politics.   
 
At EU level, these activities have been used in a way to de-legitimise the EU polity 
(Balme and Chabanet, 2008), with opposition to the European services directive proposed 
by Commissioner Bolkestein a particular rallying point, and a means of connecting with 
institutionalised NGO actors in the EU system.  Crespy notes how  
 
The Bolkestein Directive therefore constitutes a hybrid case where protest and 
institutionalised contention go hand in hand, with some actors among civil society 
pursuing dual strategies (Crespy, 2009, p.16). 
 
  Of significance is that mobilisation on the Services Directive was particularly aimed at 
the European Parliament (Fazi and Smith, 2006), making the direct connection between 
citizens and their representative organisation.  This aspect also drew in traditionally 
‘outsider’ organisations to institutionalised EU public policy making (Crespy, 2009; Parks, 
2009a).  This included groups such as ATTAC, who also become draw in during the early 
days of dialogue with DG Trade and during the Convention period drafting the 
constitutional treaty, and through the ALTER-EU alliance (Chabanet, 2006) (Chapter 3).  
Crespy, and Parks, take a more benign view of the role of contention, seeing it as a pre-
requisite for democratisation through popular mobilisation, and the presentation of 
alternative choices in the public sphere (Crespy, 2014; Parks, 2015).  In this account, 
trade union organisations, notably, link with social movements to convey contention to 
and from civil society and EU institutions, in a political system otherwise noted for 
producing ‘policies without politics’ (Schmidt n.d., in Crespy, 2014, p.85).  The orientation 
of the EU system to consensus may, paradoxically, make it more receptive to ‘shock 
tactics’ of popular mobilisation (Leiren and Parks, 2014; Parks, 2015).  The Trade Union 
movement has proved adept at popular mobilisation, including confrontational 
demonstrations in front of the European Parliament, apparently to decisive effect (Leiren 
and Parks, 2014). 
 
Mobilisation by internet activists have also featured among ‘repertoires of action’ (Parks, 
2015), with a notable example provided by the rejection by the European Parliament of 
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the European Commission’s proposal that Europe sign the global anti-counterfeiting treaty 
(ACTA).  The EP was initially favourably disposed towards the Treaty, but a decisive 
moment came when Wikileaks revealed drafts which framed the issues as going well 
beyond counterfeiting, to include trade in generic medicines, and controversial rights for 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to deny service to miscreants in a ‘3 strikes and you’re 
out’ measure, framed as including friends sharing music files (Parks, 2015).  The campaign 
against the measure, conducted by a mixture of internet activists and NGOs, was decisive, 
resulting in an overwhelming rejection by the EP.  Internet activists have also been in the 
forefront of campaigns for internet neutrality, which the European regulator recently 
upheld through placing strict conditions on the conditions under which internet service 
providers can ‘throttle’ or accelerate services.  The strict General Data Protection 
Regulation of 2016, where offending companies can be fined 4% of global turnover, is also 
a reflection of the strong politicisation of internet related politics.  The rejection by the 
European Parliament of the proposed software patent directive in 2005 provided a 
landmark point for popular politicisation of EU IT related politics (Gehlen, 2006).  The EP 
has proved to be particularly attuned to public sentiment, keen to parade its credentials 
as a popular tribune whenever issues reach high public saliency (chapter 2). 
    
 
Conclusion 
 
The breadth and depth of citizen interest mobilisation at EU level is substantial.  New 
organisations are constantly emerging to fill advocacy causes and niches, now extending 
to embrace social movements.  ‘Family’ organisations and networks of cognate NGOs have 
emerged with purposeful co-ordination and a division of labour between them. A range of 
issue alliances across segments demonstrate the presence of a ‘citizen interest 
community’. 
Of the three segments of citizen interests reviewed in this chapter, environmental 
interests appear to be the most organised, related not only to the resources upon which 
they can draw, but also to the breadth and range of advocacy organisations and the niches 
they fill, the structures which link them together, and the power of the environmental 
discourse in Europe.  Their impact can be demonstrated not only in fields of agenda-
setting, but some way beyond.  Niche organisations in the social/citizen field are by now 
also highly established, as well as institutionalised.  Whether organisations which receive 
more than three-quarters of their funding from the EU political institutions are well placed 
to help political systems develop input legitimacy will always remain an open question.  
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However, a new development since the last edition of this book has been the diversification 
of funding sources for NGOs.  Consumer affairs present a slightly different story, although 
the main NGO in the field is very well resourced.  Here, significant policy landmarks have 
arisen not from agenda setting by consumer groups, but from crisis events involving food 
or consumer product safety, and from the quest by EU institutions for output legitimacy 
through the pursuit of populist measures, such as regulating cross border mobile phone 
roaming charges.   
Together, a whole range of issues arise from this chapter for the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU, and particularly the extent to which the activities of interest organisations as 
well as engagement of the EU by social movements can be a route to the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU.  These are considered in chapter 8. 
